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Cultural influences and the mediating role of socio-cultural
integration processes on the performance of cross-border mergers
and acquisitions
Aida Hajro*
Brunel University Business School, Uxbridge, Middlesex, London, UK
This paper reports findings from a longitudinal case study (2005–2011) of a merger
between an Austrian and a German energy provider. I develop a model of socio-cultural
integration processes based on an analysis of critical incidents expressed in 71
problem-centred interviews and observations with acquired and acquiring employees at
four different points of time: immediately before the takeover and during the first
negotiation talks, and one, three and six years after the takeover. The findings suggest
that the relationship between national and organizational cultural differences andM&A
outcomes is mediated by socio-cultural integration processes defined in terms of the
formation of interpersonal relationships, trust and shared identity. Based on these
findings I formulate specific propositions and build an evidence-based model of M&A
socio-cultural integration processes that guides future research and practice.
Keywords: M&A outcomes; national and organizational cultural differences; socio-
cultural integration processes
Introduction
It has often been argued that organizational and national cultural differences can be the
main source of hostility and distrust between two merging organizations (e.g. Buono and
Bowditch 1989; Cartwright 1997; Krug and Nigh 2001), and that they are responsible for
the high failure rates of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) (King, Dalton, Daily, and Covin
2004). The ability to integrate culturally has been ranked as more important to the success
of acquisitions than financial and strategic factors (Cartwright and Cooper 1996).
Despite the fact that a growing field of inquiry has been directed at the implications of
cultural differences for the post-merger integration process (Cartwright and Schoenberg
2006), the results have remained ambiguous. While some studies (e.g., Buono and
Bowditch 1989; Chatterjee, Lubatkin, Schweiger, and Weber 1992; Olie 1994; Datta and
Puia 1995) found national and organizational cultural differences to be negatively
associated with M&A outcomes, others have argued that cultural differences may also be a
source of value creation in cross-border M&As (Larsson and Risberg 1998; Morosini,
Shane, and Singh 1998).
In response to this, recent reviews and meta-analyses (Stahl and Voigt 2005, 2008;
Teerikangas and Very 2006) have called for further exploration of cultural dynamics of
M&As. Future research should go beyond static analyses of cultural differences and focus
on the multifaceted nature of organizational and national cultures and the processes
through which cultural factors impact M&A outcomes (Vaara, Sarala, Stahl, and
Bjorkman 2010). Accordingly, greater attention should be directed towards the role of
possible mediating variables (Stahl and Voigt 2005, 2008; Vaara et al. 2010).
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For instance, socio-cultural integration processes conceptualized as a mediating
variable in the relationship between cultural differences and M&A outcomes deserve more
attention (Stahl and Voigt 2008). In this study I don’t deal with the question of whether or
not cultural differences matter in M&As, but rather investigate how they affect the
integration process (Reus and Lamont 2009). I explore how socio-cultural integration
processes defined in terms of the formation of interpersonal relationships, trust and shared
identity are affected by national and organizational cultural differences and how socio-
cultural integration processes in turn affect M&A outcomes (level of cooperation, level of
stress, resistance and turnover rate). I use a longitudinal case study of a merger between an
Austrian and a German multinational (GC) energy provider to establish causality.
Participant observations and 71 problem-centred interviews were conducted with acquired
and acquiring employees at four different points of time. Interviews were conducted with
representatives from both companies including those who are still employed and those
who left the new corporation. Having the longitudinal element allowed me to highlight the
persisting negative consequences of the merger over time.
The findings show that how different one culture is from another has limited meaning
until those cultures are brought into contact with each other. Success of M&As depends
upon the quality of socio-cultural integration processes. Based on the previous literature
and ultimately my findings, I develop a model of cultural dynamics with the following
variables: national and organizational cultural categories as the independent variable (IV);
socio-cultural integration processes as the mediating process variable; and M&A
outcomes as the dependent variable (DV). In addition, I formulate a set of propositions
regarding these mechanisms through which cultural differences affect M&A outcomes. By
assessing the influence of additional process-oriented variables in an existing framework
of research on cross-border M&As, I make a theoretical contribution (Whetton 1989); but
more valuably, I show how these factors alter our understanding of post-merger
integration dynamics.
In the following text I present first the theoretical background of my study. This is
followed by a comprehensive outline of the research methodology, a detailed presentation
of the findings and a subsequent discussion of those findings.
Literature review
My study of M&A outcomes is informed by two concepts: socio-cultural integration
processes, and national and organizational cultural differences. These two concepts
motivated the research questions, guided the data collection and directed the theoretical
analysis of the empirical findings.
Socio-cultural integration processes in the context of M&As
Regarding socio-cultural integration, I assume that the cause–effect relation between
national and organizational cultural differences and M&A outcomes can only be fully
understood if the mediating influence of socio-cultural integration processes is taken into
consideration. In order to determine important aspects of socio-cultural integration I focus
on social capital theory (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998; Tsai and Ghoshal 1998). Research
has explicitly and implicitly focused on the notion of social capital to explain the nature of
inter-organizational alliances and M&As (Shan, Walker, and Kogut 1994; Ahuja 1996;
Madhavan 1996; Koka and Prescott 2002). Defined ‘as the sum of the actual and potential
resources embedded within, available through, and derived from the network of
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relationships possessed by an individual or social unit’ (Nahapiet and Ghoshal 1998,
p. 243) the nature of social capital is important to explain performance differences among
merging firms for two reasons (Koka and Prescott 2002). First, it provides a way to
characterize a firm’s total set of relationships. Second, the emphasis is on the access to and
flow of resources to the firm through its alliances. The facets of social capital are
considered in terms of three clusters: the structural, the relational and the cognitive
dimensions of social capital. Although the three dimensions are separated analytically,
Nahapiet and Ghoshal (1998) recognize that many of the features are, in fact, highly
interrelated. The structural dimension of social capital refers to the overall pattern of
connections between employees – that is, who you reach and how you reach them (Burt
1992). In contrast, the relational dimension describes the kind of personal relationships
people have developed with each other (Granovetter 1992). The cognitive dimension
refers to those resources providing shared interpretations, and systems of meaning among
parties (Cicourel 1973). Aspects of M&A socio-cultural integration that have been
identified as relevant to synergy realization are the creation of positive relationships (Stahl
and Voigt 2005, 2008), the emergence of a sense of trust (Krug and Nigh 2001; Stahl and
Sitkin 2005) and shared identity (Larsson and Lubatkin 2001; Van Knippenberg, Van
Knippenberg, Monden, and Lima 2002) among organizational members. They map quite
well on structural (interpersonal relationships), relational (trust) and cognitive (shared
identity) social capital and justify the use of social capital as a guiding theoretical frame.
The structure of social network ties is of particular importance in the context of cross-
border M&As. Empirical evidence has shown that extensive social ties across merging
firms will foster an enhanced flow of information, leading to better decision making (Ishii
and Xuan 2010). The overall pattern of connections between the employees of two
merging firms will affect the degree to which organizations can use their respective
partner’s external knowledge and learn from them (Yli-Renko, Autio, and Sapienza 2001).
Thus, I expect that cross-firm social relationships will have a strong impact on the
outcomes of socio-cultural integration.
Trust also plays a key role in the integration process following an M&A (Stahl and
Sitkin 2005). Evidence about the importance of trust for M&A success has been drawn
from the research on intra- and inter-organizational trust. This research has shown that
trust can improve problem solving and communication and can enhance employee
commitment (Jones and George 1998; Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, and Camerer 1998; Dirks
and Ferrin 2001). Trust is also of critical importance to the formation and implementation
of cooperative alliances between firms (Das and Teng 1998; Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone
1998). Cooperative alliances share many characteristics with M&As and therefore it is not
surprising that trust also plays an important role in the M&A process (Stahl and Sitkin
2005). Interviews with managers and employees of acquired organizations (Krug and Nigh
2001) have confirmed that trust is of critical importance to successful integration of
merging firms.
A shared identity is the ultimate goal of successful acculturation. Viewed from a social
identity perspective, a merger may be defined as ‘a formal re-categorization of two social
groups as one new group’ (Van Knippenberg et al. 2002, p. 2). Given that this new group
incorporates one’s former pre-merger group the process can be seen as a continuation of
this group. However, the merged group is new. It now also incorporates the merger
partner, and thus implies a change in group membership (Van Knippenberg et al. 2002).
This interplay between ‘new’ and ‘old’ can result in the creation of a shared identity
whereby the beliefs, assumptions and values of two previously independent work forces
form a jointly determined culture (Larsson and Lubatkin 2001). In case two merging firms
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manage to create a shared identity, the expectation is that this will result in above-average
performance.
Consequently, the first research question is, ‘How are interpersonal relationships, trust
and shared identity enacted and what role do they play in bringing about positive or
negative outcomes in the context of M&As?’
Dimensions of cultural influences and their impact on M&A outcomes
The second central building block of this study is the concept of culture. When discussing
culture in the context of M&As, we must distinguish between national and organizational
culture. National culture defined as ‘the collective programming of the mind’ (Hofstede
1980, p. 25) has been measured in terms of differences in management style, business
practices or work-related values and norms. The national cultural distance hypothesis
suggests that the difficulties associated with cross-cultural contact increase with growing
cultural differences between the nations in which the two organizations are embedded
(Hofstede 1980). Based on the premise that national culture operates at a deeper level and
is learnt earlier on (Hofstede 1980), it was predicted that cultural differences at the
national level create relatively greater barriers to successful integration than do
organizational cultural differences (Stahl and Voigt 2008).
The concept of organizational culture was introduced to the M&A literature in the
early 1980s. Organizational culture has been defined as ‘a set of norms and values that are
widely shared and strongly held throughout the organisation’ (O’Reilly and Chatman
1996, p. 166). In line with the culture fit perspective it has been proposed that
organizational cultural differences can pose significant barriers to achieving integration
benefits, and that they have to be considered at an early stage of the M&A process
(Cartwright and Cooper 1996). The degree of culture compatibility between the
organizations involved in a merger or an acquisition has been identified as a critical
determinant of the subsequent integration process (David and Singh 1994; Cartwright and
Cooper 1996; Javidan and House 2002).
My aim is to elucidate the simultaneous effects of organizational and national cultural
differences on international M&As. Therefore, I employ a more in-depth approach to the
study of cultural issues in M&As and use a longitudinal research design. The second
research question addresses, ‘How do specific cultural categories impact on specific
aspects of socio-cultural integration such as the formation of interpersonal relationships,
trust and shared identity which then ultimately result in positive or negative M&A
outcomes?’
Methodology
Sample
This longitudinal study of the merger between a leading Austrian service provider and a
GC was conducted in the time period from 2005 to 2011. Participant observations and
interviews with 41 acquired and 30 acquiring employees were conducted at four different
points of time: immediately before the takeover and during the first negotiation talks, and
one, three and six years after the takeover.
The GC is one of the world’s leading suppliers of a wide range of products, solutions
and services in the field of energy technology. It is active in around 190 regions and
employs 360,000 people from around 140 nations. The Austrian engineering corporation
(AC) used to be a focused technology and service provider with leading international
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market positions in the power generation, transmission and distribution segments. It
employed around 17,000 people worldwide with subsidiaries in 45 different countries.
Both companies operated in related industries. This provided a very interesting setting
for my research study. Related M&As require higher levels of integration of cultural
differences and thus often create obstacles to integration benefits by increasing socio-
cultural problems in the post-merger integration phase (Stahl and Voigt 2008). In order to
avoid top management bias data were collected from a wider range of representatives from
different organizational levels and departments (see Vaara et al. 2010). This included
project team leaders and members, engineers, software developers, financial controllers,
chief executive officers (CEOs), directors, etc. The fact that the companies operated in
different national contexts and had very different organizational cultures provided a good
justification for the choice of the research context. More detailed information about the
informants is provided in Table 1.
Data collection: problem-centred interviews and participant observations
The primary source of data was the problem-centred interview. The problem-centred
interview focuses on reconstructing individual and group specific forms of meaning.
Before the interviews can be carried out, a literature review needs to be conducted
regarding the specifics of the social phenomenon to be analysed (first phase). The
interviewer then approaches a certain theme by combining an open narrative at the
beginning with prepared questions in later stages of the interview (second phase). A short
questionnaire, which asks for socio-statistical data relevant to the analysis, concludes the
interview session (third phase). Emphasis is put on the perspective of individuals by
analysing important personal experiences. Interviewees are asked to talk about these
personal experiences, to incorporate them into their action orientations and to finally
reflect on them (Scheibelhofer 2008). The method has the advantage of neutralizing the
contradiction between being either completely directed by theory or fully open-minded
without any theoretical preconceptions (Witzel 2000).
In the second phase of the problem-centred interview the critical incidents approach
was employed. This is a behaviour-centred methodology that was developed by Flanagan
(1954) to identify behavioural characteristics of effective and ineffective job
performance. It has been viewed as particularly appropriate for cultural analysis (Gundry
and Rousseau 1994). The approach has been described as ‘a qualitative interview
procedure which facilitates the investigation of significant occurrences (events, incidents,
processes, or issues) identified by the respondent, the way they are managed, and the
outcomes in terms of perceived effects’ (Chell 1998, p. 56). The focus of my attention
was on how individuals coped with problems resulting from cultural differences. For
each incident, the respondent was asked to recount the circumstances that led to the
incident, the solutions used to solve the problem, and the consequences of the action
undertaken.
On average, the interviews lasted 52 minutes. Fifty-seven out of 71 conversations were
audio-taped, resulting in 684 pages of transcript. The interviews were conducted in
German and English. Four investigators were involved in the data collection. The
convergence of their observations enhanced confidence in the findings while their
complementary insights added to the richness of the data (Eisenhardt 1989; Gephart 2004).
The researchers also spent considerable time in the companies observing M&A dynamics.
The data obtained from participant observations produced an immense amount of detailed
description and were used for the purpose of triangulation. Interview findings and
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observations were discussed in numerous meetings among the four researchers, leading to
new knowledge generation.
Coding and analytical process
ATLAS.ti software for qualitative data analysis was employed. In the first stage, all four
interviewers were involved in the coding with ATLAS.ti. Reliability was reached by all
coders coding first a sample of eight interviews in parallel and independently from each
other, and subsequently discussing together the results on the codes derived from the
analysis.
The first step was to identify excerpts from the interviews and observational notes
which pertained to three theoretically derived categories of concepts: (1) culture,
(2) socio-cultural integration processes and (3) M&A outcomes. In the next step first-order
codes, which captured nuances of the raw data in the categories, were derived (Strauss and
Corbin 1998). For instance, examples of first-order codes regarding cultural differences
pertained to differences in the level of assertiveness, uncertainty avoidance and
communication style between German and Austrian employees, process versus results
orientation, blame versus non-blame culture, differences in the level of organizational
identification, ethnocentric versus multicultural orientation, tight versus loose hierarchy
and task versus employee focus. These cultural differences were more closely associated
with socio-cultural integration outcomes than value creation for the shareholders (see also
Stahl and Voigt 2008). Thus, examples of first-order codes regarding outcomes that were
derived from the data were level of cooperation, perceived stress, resistance and turnover
rate. These outcomes were found to be critical indicators of M&A success and failure from
the perspective of the respondents. As a third step, first-order codes were assembled into
higher order themes (Strauss and Corbin 1998). At the same time the insights that emerged
from the data were tied to the existing literature. This enhanced the internal validity,
generalizability and conceptual level of the study (Eisenhardt 1989). For example, with
regard to socio-cultural integration processes, I derived the theme ‘shared identity’, which
collapsed the first-order codes ‘inter-group polarization’, ‘inter-group identities’, ‘out-
group perceptions’ and ‘perceived cultural distance’. The emergence of the data structure
is illustrated in Figure 1:
Theoretically Informed
Categories
First Order Codes Higher Order Themes
Culture
Socio-cultural 
integration
M&A outcomes
Level of assertiveness
Uncertainty avoidance
Communication style
Process versus result orientation
Blame versus non blame culture
Differences in the level of organizational identification
Ethnocentric versus multicultural orientation
Tight versus loose hierarchy
Task versus employee focus Predictability in the expectations about others’ behaviours
Confidence in goodwill
Opportunism
Level of information sharing
Interpersonal distrust
Inter-organizational distrust
Intergroup polarization
In-group identities
Perceived cultural distance
Out-group perceptions
Level of cooperation, perceived stress, resistance, turnover rate
National and 
organisational
culture
Formation of 
interpersonal
relationships, trust,
shared identity
Socio-cultural 
integration 
outcomes
Figure 1. Emergence of data structure.
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Finally the findings were merged into a tentative model of M&A dynamics that I will
present in the following sections.
Empirical findings
The following section contains a detailed description of the influences of specific cultural
categories on specific socio-cultural integration processes, followed by an explanation of
the impact of these socio-cultural integration processes on M&A outcomes. Based on the
empirical findings, I develop a model of M&A socio-cultural integration processes and
define propositions for future quantitative research.
The influence of specific cultural categories on socio-cultural integration processes
Subtle but disturbing cultural differences between Austrian and German employees
surfaced when they started working together. Austrian respondents described their
German colleagues as very assertive during interpersonal interactions at work. The
language that people used tended to be straightforward. While Germans preferred direct
criticism (‘this is totally wrong’) and tolerated conflict as an acceptable approach,
Austrians emphasized diplomatic criticism (‘this is a very interesting issue, but maybe we
should also concentrate on this fact’). In addition, Austrians stressed the need for a less
confrontational approach to interpersonal relations, while for Germans getting the task
done and achieving high quality standards was more important than interpersonal
consideration. Differences in the level of assertiveness and communication styles had a
detrimental impact on interpersonal relationship building between these two cultural
groups. The resulting interpersonal conflicts led to stress and emotional strain in cross-
cultural interactions. While Austrians continued to put emphasis on concern about others,
being friendly and sensitive, Germans remained task-oriented and direct. This situation is
illustrated by the following quotation:
Effective leadership is about dealing with people as much as it is about dealing with tasks,
deadlines, strategy etc . . . If you have managers who are insensitive to the feelings of others,
how can you expect personal relationships to develop . . . ? How? You cannot deal effectively
with revolutionary change, the type of change that we are facing right now, if you don’t have
good relationships with your employees. (AC, CEO, Mexico)
Moreover, Germans relied on rules and institutional procedures to reduce stress when
facing uncertainty. Consequently, they introduced many rules, regulations and constraints
in the lives of the Austrian employees. For them, getting the task done on time and
minimizing errors seemed to be most important. Austrians very soon gained the
impression that rule-breaking behaviour could be punished and this gradually decreased
their level of trust in German leaders. The necessary psychological safety for mutual
learning and effective collaboration was not provided.
Germans come here, try to roll over us with a steamroller, and then they find a little bump and
become desperate because they don’t know how to deal with it. This is really typical German
behavior . . . It is simply the fact that they don’t know how to deal with uncertainty . . . They
need clear structures and many processes in place . . . Their German thoroughness makes
them far too anxious . . . They have this pathological problem that they must have everything
under control . . . Austrians on the other hand are lax, loose and more flexible, but at the same
time also slightly less sorted and more disorganized. (AC, Member of the Board of Directors)
A high level of uncertainty avoidance in combination with assertive behaviour limited the
formation of interpersonal relationships, mutual trust and shared identity among Austrian
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and German employees. The fact that German employees were perceived as more
assertive, confrontational and aggressive in social relationships than their Austrian
counterparts had a negative impact on the number of relationships between the acquired
and acquiring employees. At the same time, the reliance on social norms and rules of
behaviour in combination with bureaucratic practices harmed the formation of trust and
worsened the quality of existing relationships. The underlying national cultural value
differences also decreased the potential creation of a jointly determined culture.
These findings are in accordance with the GLOBE study results that indicate higher
scores of the societal culture practices on the dimension of uncertainty avoidance in West
Germany compared to Austria (Szabo, Brodbeck, Den Hartog, Reber, Weibler, and
Wunderer 2002). While the GLOBE study scores of the societal culture practices on the
dimension of assertiveness are higher in Austria than in Former West Germany, which
contrasts my findings, the value dimension of assertiveness shows higher scores in Former
West Germany than Austria. Societal cultural practices and values do not always go in
parallel. Differences may reflect societal changes (Szabo et al. 2002). The higher level of
desired assertiveness in Former West Germany compared to Austria may explain why my
data contrasts the findings concerning cultural practices of the GLOBE study.
Consequently, I hypothesize the following:
Proposition 1. High levels of assertiveness and uncertainty avoidance among German
representatives in combination with direct criticizing and confrontational behaviours will
have a detrimental impact on the formation of interpersonal relationships, trust and shared
identity in Austrian-German groups.
Based on the fact that national culture operates at a deeper level, I assumed that
cultural differences at the national level would create greater barriers to successful
collaboration than organizational cultural differences. However, the empirical findings
revealed the opposite. While only 15 respondents related the problems faced in the process
of socio-cultural integration to national cultural differences, all agreed that organizational
cultural differences were the main cause for negative interactions between Austrian and
German employees. In Table 2 I summarize the main differences in organizational
cultures of the two firms, provide relevant citations to substantiate my claims and list
aspects of socio-cultural integration that were affected by these differences.
Process-oriented project versus results-oriented product organization
While GC put great emphasis on processes, AC relied much more on results. Due to its
strong process-orientation it was reported that GC exhibited superior performance in
stable environments. Yet in the context of M&As, its strong reliance on stable processes
decreased the company’s adaptability to changed external demands. As a product
organization the firm’s sales force and its organization of marketing, production,
procurement activities, etc. were deployed so that a separate division was responsible for
each of its major products or product groups. Individuals were highly specialized and
worked on the accomplishment of their tasks. This structure encouraged more individual
work and facilitated less interaction between employees. The maintenance of processes
and individual contributions were seen as key success factors by GC respondents.
AC had a project organizational structure. As such, the company employed a
framework of policies and procedures to break its organization into manageable groups.
This structure enabled AC to function with fewer managers and to focus on the
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Table 2. Organizational cultural differences and their impact on aspects of socio-cultural
integration.
Organizational culture Citations
Socio-cultural
integration
aspects affected
AC: Results-oriented
product organization
‘At GC you have 1000 processes and 100 people who are
responsible for managing these processes. So, I always
had the feeling that GC aims at satisfying the system in
order to receive a certain percentage of responses. What
is really written down is not that relevant. It is important
that on day X you have received feedback that needs to
be written down in a file!’ (AC, CEO, Indonesia)
Interpersonal
relationships
and trust
GC: Process-oriented
project organization
‘Processes are very important for us. How do you want to
run a multinational company without having global
processes in place? Not possible if you ask me! So, we
asked AC employees to adapt our internal processes.
They were invited to attend numerous workshops. I
know that they were not very happy about this, but this is
simply how it works in our house!’ (GC, Project
manager)
AC: Weak culture ‘Many of these lateral thinkers sometimes, how shall I
put it, these free spirits that are difficult to control, but
which were a great asset to our company, you will find
few of these, or significantly fewer than here, at GC.’
(AC, Member of the Board of Directors)
Shared identity
GC: Strong culture ‘At GC we have a strong corporate culture. As you know
we are a big global company. Without global
coordination and enhanced control we would not be able
to function as such.’ (GC, Employee)
AC: Non-blame
culture
‘The first thing you have to do if you are exposed to a
serious problem is to laugh about it and then solve it . . .
Don’t point with the finger! Have a diplomatic approach!
Stay away from stamping with the fist on the table!’ (AC,
Project manager)
Trust and
shared identity
GC: Blame culture ‘You know how it works here at GC . . . . If the bottom
line is ok, everything is good. If this is not the case, then
you could face some serious problems.’ (GC, First
Assistant of GC CEO)
AC: Multicultural
orientation
‘Because the company was founded in Germany, all
technologies and managerial techniques are German, and
once the company started expanding abroad it
transferred its know-how to foreign subsidiaries. AC, as
an Austrian company, was created out of many Austrian
firms. Slowly the company started expanding by
acquiring new enterprises in different countries. This
way the company had to integrate different national
cultures into its own culture . . . . GC was expanding
from Germany and was establishing factories in different
countries. AC was buying factories. This way, new
cultures were brought in. This is how we created Europe.
The difference between Europe and the USA equals the
difference between AC and GC.’ (AC, CEO Mexico)
Trust and
shared identity
GC: Ethnocentric
orientation
‘It is great that you have your culture in your country,
and that you act accordingly outside of the company. But
here in the company, we would like to have our culture.’
(GC, Team member)
(Continued)
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achievement of results. Hierarchies were flattened, workers were assigned to teams in
business units, and these teams would take some of the duties previously performed by
managers. This way, employees could focus on a single production process rather than
having to perform the same task for a variety of products. All workers were expected to
have broad-based skills to perform multiple functions and to actively participate in
detecting and solving problems. This way, synergies were created between the members of
a project team. Reducing existing hierarchies and improving the information sharing
processes facilitated cooperation between different departments. According to the
respondents the implementation of flat hierarchies and the transfer of power to
autonomous project teams were seen as critical success factors of AC. Teams had the
freedom to set their own norms and values of interaction. Processes were not that
important and the main emphasis was on achieving good results.
‘While we used to have a broad scope of responsibilities, employees at GC were highly
specialised and worked on the accomplishment of specific, individual tasks . . . AC has
always been a project organization and GC a strong product organization.’ (AC, CEO,
Indonesia)
Immediately after the merger, employees learnt about the differences in result versus
process orientation and structures between the two companies. AC employees soon
realized that they had to change their existing processes to get integrated into GC. Yet they
Table 2 – continued
Organizational culture Citations
Socio-cultural
integration
aspects affected
AC: Loose hierarchyy ‘I can tell you that decision making processes take much
longer at GC. People responsible for decision making are
on average 15 years older than those at AC. It takes an
employee much longer to get through this rigid structure
and be promoted. On the other side, we are a smaller
organisation, with less complicated structures and more
opportunities for young, ambitious people to be
rewarded for their achievements.’ (AC, Member of the
Board of Directors)
Interpersonal
relationships
GC: Tight hierarch ‘As this is the case among all large organizations,
corporations or governments . . . I agree that we are a
hierarchical organisation with a wide span of control . . . .
when you have reached a certain level you must join the
waiting queue. I am now 40 year old and I know that if I
want to get to the next level I have to wait until I am 50.’
(GC, Executive officer)
AC: Employee
oriented
‘What I experienced at AC is cooperation at a very high
level. This cooperation was based on mutual under-
standing and helping each other and on joint use of
available resources so that we all could reach our
personal and professional goals . . . Great cooperation
and collaboration with a strong emphasis on employees.’
(AC, Team leader)
Interpersonal
relationships
GC: Task-oriented ‘I would say that we are very task-oriented. The priority
is to meet the deadlines, satisfy the customers and get the
tasks done. This is how it works here.’ (GC, Head of
Group)
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also expected GC employees to value their organization of work, identify best practices
and discuss opportunities how these could be transferred to the GC. To their surprise GC
refused to engage in any kind of mutual adaptation. This in turn had a detrimental impact
on the formation of interpersonal relationships and trust. Soon, AC employees lost
confidence in the behaviour and goodwill of GC members. This was supposed to be a
friendly merger and the expectation was that both parties would learn about the strengths
of the other and find a way to implement these into their own structures. The realization of
synergies was strongly emphasized during conversations but when it came to its
realization GC members would step back. The development of interpersonal relations and
trust was only possible if one could rely on its partner to fulfil obligations, behave in a
predictable manner and act fairly when the opportunity for opportunism was present.
However, these conditions were not provided. GC as a strong process-oriented
organization with a product organizational structure refused to create synergies and learn
from the result-oriented project organization of AC. Thus, I propose the following:
Proposition 2. Differences in process- and result-orientation of two merging firms will
have a negative impact on the development of interpersonal relationships and trust.
Identification with the organization/strong culture and identification with the profession/
weak culture
As a multinational with a strong German heritage GC was described as an organization with
a clear set of norms of behaviour that were widely shared and strongly held throughout the
organization. Executives strongly believed that good coordination within the firm and
improved goal alignment between the employees would increase performance in the long
run. Goal alignment also gave less room for debate between different parties about the firm’s
best interests. The widespread agreement about appropriate values and norms of behaviour
increased behavioural consistency within the organization and at the same time facilitated its
social control. This way the violation of behavioural norms could be corrected faster.
Employees would execute their routines extremely well. They preferred a predictable stable
world. Any proposed change programmes or reorganizations were treated with anxiety. The
organization and its members had greater difficulty recognizing the need for change. In
addition, due to normative pressures and strictly formulated code of behaviour newmembers
were socialized quickly. This limited the length of time new members had to hold different
views and pose a threat to the execution of organizational routines.
At AC employees identified more with their type of job than the organization. The
company had undergone several mergers before the takeover and was highly
decentralized. Respondents stressed the importance of continuous exploitation of existing
knowledge and exploration of new possibilities. Executives were very good at creating
sufficient incentives for employees to remain motivated to learn new things and sufficient
direction and support to allow incremental learning to occur. As such, the organization
showed a strong ability to perceive environmental shifts and a willingness to accept the
uncertainty that accompanied fundamental changes in organizational processes. The firm
used to allow individuals to hold different ideas and to incorporate new insights into the
organization’s procedures. By exhibiting weak socialization pressures on its employees,
the corporation remained good at learning from its members.
These differences in the level of corporate identification combined with emerging
anxieties about the future limited the formation of a shared identity. For a shared identity
to emerge, both cultures had to be open for change. GC was used to performing its
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organizational routines with consistency. The company was not used to adapting these
routines to changing environmental conditions. AC employees stressed the need for
learning and modification in organizational routines. However, their claims were
consistently ignored.
The attempt to desperately try to merge two previously independent firms is nonsense. He
should accept that different processes can exist next to each other . . . If we say that we are a
company consisting of individuals who are intelligent and wise, then we should give them
credit for this and trust that they will be able to adapt . . . The biggest obstacle to successful
integration is the dictation from the top, the order to adjust . . . This way you can’t create a
common identity. (AC, Member of the Board of Directors)
Consequently, I propose the following:
Proposition 3. Differences in the strength of organizational cultures (weak versus strong
identification with the corporation) of two merging firms will have a negative impact
on the formation of a shared identity unless there is willingness for mutual adaptation on
both sides.
Blame culture and non-blame culture
While employees at AC were consistently rewarded not only for correct responses but also
for detecting errors so that they could be corrected, rewards for error detection were
lacking at GC. Due to the lack of safe environment employees from the Austrian company
felt that innovative thinking and experimentation were not rewarded in the new firm. They
felt anxious of making mistakes. The culture of management at GC was built around the
assumption that mistakes could occur but that one should not make the same mistakes
twice. The fear of punishment was constantly present.
These differences in organizational cultures decreased the level of trust of AC
employees. The knowledge about the blame culture of GC served as a foundation for their
decision whether or not to trust. They disregarded the way GC was encouraging creativity
and knowledge creation. Managers would point with a finger in case something was done
wrong or not according to their expectations. As a consequence, the idea of new
approaches or new types of behaviour was likely to result in anxiety. Employees would fall
back on behavioural patterns that were reliable in avoiding punishment in the past. From
the point of view of AC employees learning based on punishment was detrimental to
exploration and new idea generation. The stick over the carrot strategy could only build
resistance to new learning. These differences in values and norms of behaviour between
the two merging firms resulted in weak formation of trust. AC employees decided not to
make any emotional investments in trust relationships with GC members since they didn’t
believe that these sentiments could be reciprocated in an organization that punished best
intentions if they didn’t immediately result in high returns for the firm. In addition, the
differences in organizational cultures decreased shared identity formation. The pressure
for sameness stimulated and revealed more starkly the nature of these differences. Instead
of negotiating a new shared identity members from AC showed a strong attempt to re-
enforce their existing cultural differences as can be seen from the following quotation.
From the beginning they showed a strong tendency to look for one person who could be held
responsible for a mistake, an accident etc. GC employees were not used to take many risks,
didn’t speak their mind nor did come up with new ideas in our joint meetings. We on the other
hand emphasized open dialogue, creativity and regarded the cost associated to a mistake far
less expensive than a stagnant blame culture. Enforcement was counterproductive and didn’t
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work. Very soon we started re-enforcing our cultural identity. This ultimately harmed a shared
identity formation. (AC, Engineer)
I propose the following:
Proposition 4. Differences in organizational assumptions regarding how mistakes
should be handled (rewards for error detection versus punishment of errors) will have a
negative impact on the formation of trust and shared identity.
Ethnocentric and multicultural orientation
At GC organizational knowledge was stored in its procedures, norms and rules. Employees
from AC reported that German national culture had a strong impact on the formation of
GC organizational culture. The company was founded in Germany and started expanding
by building its own factories in foreign countries. Research and development activities
remained centred in the corporate HQ. Technological and managerial techniques were
then transferred from Germany to host-country subsidiaries of GC. Yet this link between
the societal and organizational culture was less apparent to members of GC. They didn’t
regard Germany as a potentially major source of influence on the organizational culture of
their company because it was not salient to them. However, they saw the match between
high levels of individualism, high assertiveness and a direct communication style as
positively related to their company’s success. They believed that what was good for them
would also be good for AC employees. As a consequence, they tried to transfer their
management techniques and management know-how to the Austrian service provider.
AC, on the other side, used to put great emphasis on cultural diversity. The company
was created out of many Austrian firms. It then started expanding by acquiring new
enterprises in different countries and cultures. In order to remain successful in the host
countries it had to integrate these different national cultures into its own corporate culture.
By enacting the values and norms of behaviour of its international employees, which
shaped managerial assumptions about the nature of employees and how the organization
needed to be structured for such employees, AC created an environment of trust among its
business units, subsidiaries and teams. The corporation accumulated its knowledge over
time by learning from its multicultural workforce.
By trying to transfer its management techniques and management know-how to AC,
GC induced a culture shock to the Austrian firm. The experience of a radical systematic
change resulted in uncertainty. At the beginning it was not a question of whether AC
employees wanted to adjust or not. It appeared to be the case that the majority had serious
difficulties coping with enforced change on this scale. In addition, GC didn’t try to
combine management by confidence building, to provide orientation and to support the
self-esteem of acquired members. The required adjustment to new circumstances was
confusing and even traumatic for some members of AC. This in turn harmed the creation
of trust and shared identity. Thus, I propose the following:
Proposition 5. An ethnocentric orientation that results in the enforced transfer of
management techniques and management know-how from the acquirer to the acquired
firm will harm the creation of trust and shared identity.
Tight and loose hierarchy
GC was characterized by tight hierarchy. The organization assumed that innovation could
be implemented through authoritarian/paternalistic methods of decision making. This
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implied that power and influence resided in positions, statuses and roles. GC employees
believed that implementing decisions in flatter organizations was more difficult since such
organizations servedmultiple constituencies andwere often team-based and geographically
dispersed. From their point of view, tighter control provided more stability, continuity and
predictable career paths and reward systems. In addition, each manager used to have a clear
span of control, which created a set of obligations and role differentiations. Tight hierarchy
also limited the level of perceived uncertainty in the organization.
At AC, on the other hand, employees strongly believed that power and influence in
decision making should be a function of who has what expertise relevant to any given task
to be accomplished. As a result, the organization was structured around self-directed and
self-managed cross-functional work teams in which power derived from expertise and not
position. A decentralized approach to management and high employee involvement in
decision making was emphasized. Control was dispersed throughout the organization with
emphasis on self-control and problem solving. Individuals used to take personal
responsibility for work outcomes. They would monitor their own performance and seek
corrective action when necessary. The main incentive of work was the work itself and not
necessarily individual career progression. The firm was described as a collectivistic
organization with strong emphasis on cooperation and collaboration. According to the
respondents such an organization was very good in implementing new ideas. Employees
were motivated to identify the relevant areas in which innovation was needed, to generate
good ideas, to stimulate creativity and to implement best ideas.
Employees from both companies strongly believed that their approach would result in
higher firm performance in the long run. While AC employees claimed that a tight
hierarchy in such a large traditional organization like GC, coupled with top management’s
distance from the market, could easily result in a lack of flexibility to respond to changing
market needs, GC employees questioned the idea that managers could effectively lead by
monitoring without controlling. These differences in the desired level of hierarchy resulted
in little formation of interpersonal relationships between the two corporations as
illustrated by the following quotation:
The organization of GC is a pyramid structure with a top-down way approach. Power is
concentrated in the topof the pyramid anddecisionsflow from the top down.Thismeans that one
is supposed to dowhat the leader says.ACon the other handhas a loosehierarchy.Here it ismore
about what you know and whom you know. It is very important that organizational members
connectwith one another. This difference in the level of hierarchy has decreased ourwillingness
to build network relationships with GC employees. We are not used to just follow orders but
would like to analyse, critically discuss and evaluate joint decisions. (AC, CEO, Indonesia)
Therefore, I propose the following:
Proposition 6. Differences in the preferred levels of hierarchy (tight versus loose
hierarchy) of two merging firms will negatively impact the formation of interpersonal
relationships between their employees.
Task-oriented and employee-oriented
At GC, the focus of attention was on achieving efficiency in operations and getting the
tasks done. Leaders were interested in completing assignments. They would define the
roles of others, explain what to do and why, establish patterns of organization and
determine how the tasks should be accomplished. They believed that this way they could
best motivate the group members to work hard in order to achieve corporate goals. They
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strived towards fostering a culture of productivity in their units. The main focus was on the
work being done and how to maintain successful operations. Some leaders preferred to
keep their distance psychologically from their team members. As a result, they were
perceived by AC employees as controlling and cold. Timely and successful task
accomplishment was their number one priority and thus less emphasis was put on concern
for people.
At AC close attention to the needs of employees for satisfying interpersonal
relationships led to a friendly organizational climate and culture. The organization
strongly believed that performance was only possible if a balance between the necessity of
getting the job done and maintaining employee morale was achieved. Leaders trusted their
employees and felt less need to control them. Opportunities for minority opinions to be
expressed were provided and an acceptance of interdependence among group members
was promoted. Employees felt that they were receiving social support from their
supervisors.
These differences in task and employee orientation led to several critical incidents
between AC and GC employees. Respondents from the GC argued that due to the heavy
workload and tight deadlines they were often forced to be more task-oriented and less
willing to devote too much time and energy to building relationships. They didn’t take the
personal concerns of the acquired employees very seriously. AC employees who rated
relationships more than task accomplishments claimed that these organizational cultural
differences were responsible for the lack of superior–subordinate relationships in the new
entity.
Thus, I propose:
Proposition 7. Differences in task versus employee orientation between the acquirer and
the acquired company will have a negative impact on interpersonal relationship building.
Socio-cultural integration processes and their impact on M&A outcomes
As described in the previous section I first focused on pre-acquisition cultural differences
and the situation at the time of the takeover. Now I will pay attention to the dynamics of
the socio-cultural integration process and their impact on M&A outcomes over time. The
formation of interpersonal relationships, trust and shared identity were shown to have a
significant impact on the level of cooperation, resistance, perceived stress and turnover
rate. These outcome measures captured the degree of conflict at the socio-cultural level
and were found to be critical indicators of M&A success and failure from the perspective
of the employees.
Interpersonal relationships
Due to several critical incidents that emerged between AC and GC employees I could
observe a lower level of interpersonal relationship building. A good example was reported
by a CEO of AC who used to work in Mexico at the time when the merger was announced
and first negotiation talks took place. He was told that the main reason for the merger was
to create synergies and benefit from each others’ core competencies. The GC stressed at
that time that this was not supposed to be an acquisition and used the term merger instead
to portray the aimed combination between two equals. However, spoken words didn’t
match observed behaviour. A come-together event was organized by the Austrian service
provider, and GC members including their CEO were invited to attend so that they could
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get to know each other on a more personal level. The organizers strongly believed that
joint socialization and shared experience could best facilitate lasting change in
organizational values and processes. Their past experience has shown that the greater the
number of shared experiences within a certain period of time is, the easier a shared
understanding of individual needs and mutual adaptation can be achieved. Yet to their big
surprise and despite the fact that all five GC members confirmed their participation, none
of them joined the event. This created confusion and disappointment among the
representatives of the Austrian corporation and resulted in low levels of interpersonal
relationship building between the two parties.
The next critical incident emerged as the CEO of AC was asked to close his operations
and sell the existing facilities within 15 days. AC had 450 m2 of office space in the centre
of Mexico City. Selling this property within such a short period of time was not advisable
but it had to be done. Now it became clear to the Austrian representatives that this was not
supposed to be a friendly merger of equals. They soon felt surrounded in an aura of
conquest. High pressures were placed on them to comply with the expectations of the
buying firm. AC members felt unappreciated by GC employees who believed that they
could utilize the acquired firm’s physical and human capital more efficiently. The closing
of the operations didn’t immediately result in dismissal of Austrian representatives. They
were asked to send their CVs and were invited to attend interviews so that the acquirer
could learn about their competences and find appropriate jobs for them in its Mexican
subsidiary. The AC CEO asked to be sent to Austria where he was appointed as key
country manager for former Yugoslav countries. He was originally from this region, spoke
the language and was familiar with the mentality and working practices of its people. Back
at home the situation only worsened. He was forced to surrender his familiar
administrative practices, to negotiate decisions that he wanted to make and to look to the
buying firm for approval. He felt that these actions served to diminish his perception of his
relative standing and to make him feel dominated by and inferior to the acquiring
employees. Yet he felt stronger and interpreted these actions as a lack of self-confidence of
acquiring managers. The reported incidents further decreased the level of interpersonal
relationship building and resulted in low cooperation with colleagues from GC. In
addition, the CEO started showing individual opposition to the subsequent ‘forced
integration’ of the joining firms by voice, absenteeism and disobedience.
We decided to organize a come-together event and they agreed to join us . . . What happened
next, they didn’t come. Nothing left. No apologies, no excuses. Then, I was asked to sell the
facilities in Mexico. I told them that I couldn’t sell the office space immediately . . . They told
us that we had 15 days left . . . They behaved in a very insensitive and assertive manner. They
tried to give us the feeling of inferiority. This is how they behaved in Mexico. Here in Vienna I
had direct contact with younger managers. At that time I was still willing to help them so I
gave them the information they needed . . . They totally ignored me. Employee tensions soon
exacerbated, interpersonal relationships worsened and we started resisting their attempt to
conquer us. (AC, CEO, Mexico)
Thus, I propose:
Proposition 8. Harmed interpersonal relationships will result in low levels of
cooperation and strong resistance on the part of the acquired employees.
Trust
The low level of trust in GC management was reported to be the main cause of perceived
stress among AC employees. The announcement of the merger in autumn 2004 caused a
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tremendous turmoil in Austria. Being aware of this, GC management assured that it was
supposed to be a friendly takeover between two strong players in the industry. At that time
AC members still had great trust in GC. The GC was one of the three major global players
in the energy and engineering sectors. Austrian employees saw this takeover as an
opportunity to work for a global player. As soon as the initial confusion and unrest calmed
down they became very excited about the future. However, the failure of GC to keep its
promises diminished their excitement and as a result distrust and anxiety about the future
prevailed again.
We were first informed that GC was planning to take over AC in autumn 2004. There was
tremendous turmoil. At that time we still believed that the takeover would not be accepted by
the Austrian government. For two months we did not hear anything. Then we were told that
AC will remain independent. A few months later it was then official. The integration started.
At that time we still believed in what we were told. Together we are stronger! It was supposed
to be a friendly merger . . . But in reality what happened is that we were seen as a competitor
and GC intention was to destroy us. That was our impression. We were treated as second class
citizens. As a result we lost the trust in our government, in politicians, in GC employees. Our
response to this was resistance . . . . (AC, Project Team Member)
Distrust in relational exchange strongly influenced interactions between the employees
of the two firms and harmed any attempts to negotiate or derive common solutions.
High levels of stress and resistance on both sides increased the conflict potential.
Interpersonal and inter-organizational distrust were strongly related and emerged almost
at the same time. As a consequence, the effects of distrust were mutually enforced at the
two levels. These findings were supported by both groups of employees. Respondents
from the GC admitted that they had initially focused too much on the portfolio, the
organizational structures and processes. Less attention was paid to the employees.
We were very much focused on organizational structures, processes and portfolios. The
complexity of getting these parts integrated was extremely high. We had 170 legal entities that
needed to be managed. The consequence was that we lost the employees. The communication
broke down and it was obvious that we had made a mistake by being ignorant for their needs.
(GC, Team member)
Distrust led to excessive stress and lack of cooperation on the part of acquired employees
that was associated with a number of dysfunctional outcomes including absenteeism and
reduced job performance. The failure of GC to deal with the human side of the integration
and communicate its intentions to AC members left the acquired employees uncertain
about their future and motivated them to seek other means to reduce their uncertainty such
as reliance on rumours. These were not an effective means of reducing anxiety since they
tended to focus on negative information. The importance of resistance was an additional
dysfunctional individual outcome in the employees of the acquired firm. AC respondents
coped with the low level of trust in GC by reducing their commitment and showing
resistance. They used their energy either to cope with stress and confusion or to try to find
new employment opportunities. The negative consequences didn’t go away with time.
Contrary to my expectations they became more serious as time passed. This finding was
supported by both groups of respondents, those from GC as well as those from AC. Thus, I
propose the following:
Proposition 9. Interpersonal distrust will increase the level of perceived stress and
decrease cooperation resulting in high resistance on the part of the acquired
employees.
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Shared identity
As I started this research I assumed that pre-merger identities would be threatened from
the beginning leading to negative inter-group relations in M&As. My expectation was that
members from the acquired organization would experience higher threats to their pre-
merger identity and thus demonstrate a stronger in-group bias. To my surprise the
dynamics were quite different. As already described in the first section of the empirical
findings, AC employees used to identify more with their type of job than with the
organization. As the merger between the Austrian service provider and the GC was
announced they showed the willingness to integrate into GC organizational culture. They
were excited about the opportunity to work for such a well-established company.
However, the situation changed due to the inability of the acquirer to manage expectations
and deal effectively with the human aspects of the merger. In response to this AC
employees suddenly started creating a shared identity among themselves. It was less the
amount of change to its pre-merger culture that was seen as a threat but more the way this
change was enforced. As their identity strengthened the in-group commitment and
cooperation of AC members increased resulting in stronger inter-group polarization
between the German and the Austrian company. In an attempt to secure self-esteem,
access to rare resources (e.g., information) and to maintain their distinctiveness the in-
group identities of the acquired employees became more salient. In addition, they started
questioning their past identity: ‘Who are we? Who are we going to be in the new
organization? Who do we want to be?’ AC employees began to judge themselves more
positively in terms of competence, creativity and success. At the same time this decreased
the perceived value of GC as the out-group. This process can be very well illustrated by the
following two quotations:
I don’t think that we had a strong corporate identity before the merger. We have developed a
common spirit after the takeover as response to the humiliating integration strategies of GC.
(AC, Member of the Board of Directors)
One year after the takeover you could see that there was the AC and the GC group . . . Two
years later GC employees started asking themselves what went wrong. There was no common
identity but two distinctive in-group identities forced to live under one roof. (AC, Team
member)
As a consequence, AC employees started leaving GC in 2006. The voluntary turnover rate
reached its peak in 2008 as 10 to 15 members from the Austrian service provider began to quit
their jobs and move to competitors every week. Those who were highly qualified left first.
Once they got to know the corporate philosophy of GC, its strategic orientation and long-term
aims and objectives, they decided to join its main competitors and transfer their valuable
knowledge and expertise. Those who had difficulties finding new jobs stayed, including older
employees aged 58 and above who didn’t have a choice but to continue working for GC in
hope that they could retire soon. According to the respondents around 68% of AC employees
in the HQ left the GC during the first six years after the takeover.
And this is when they started leaving. It was 2006. The turnover rate reached its peak in 2008.
10 to 15 employees would leave every week. Those who were capable of finding a new job
somewhere else left. Less qualified and more senior people stayed. (GC, Team member)
Therefore, I propose the following:
Proposition 10. An increase in the salience of shared identity will lead to a stronger
inter-group polarization between the merging firms and result in higher voluntary
turnover.
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Concluding discussion
National and organizational cultural differences have often been cited as a key reason for
the high failure rate of domestic and cross-border M&As in the management literature
(Krug and Nigh 2001; King et al. 2004). However, empirical research has not been
conclusive in demonstrating the direction of the impact of these differences on M&A
dynamics (Teerikangas and Very 2006; Stahl and Voigt 2008; Vaara et al. 2010).
Consequently, the purpose of this study has been to provide a more comprehensive
explanation of cross-border M&A outcomes. I demonstrate that the causality between
national and organizational cultural differences and M&A outcomes has a higher degree of
complexity than previous studies were able to show. In this study I focus on how cultural
differences affect integration processes, and what other factors facilitate or hinder
successful socio-cultural integration in M&As. This way I respond to the call by several
authors (Stahl and Voigt 2005, 2008; Teerikangas and Very 2006; Vaara et al. 2010) who
have stressed the need to ‘open the black box’ of socio-cultural integration in order to
understand how these processes may contribute to the success or failure of M&As.
With the aim to explore this complexity in more detail I conducted a longitudinal study
of a merger between a leading Austrian service provider and a GC. Participant
observations and 71 interviews with acquired and acquiring employees were conducted at
four different points of time. Based on the empirical findings I then developed a model of
M&A socio-cultural integration processes and their outcomes.
In this study I stress the importance of two concepts in explaining M&A outcomes:
national and organizational cultural differences as the main effect, and socio-cultural
integration processes as the mediating variable. Based on the empirical findings I show
that specific national and organizational cultural categories have a significant impact on
specific socio-cultural integration processes such as the creation of interpersonal
relationships, trust and shared identity. The formation of interpersonal relationships, trust
and shared identity in turn has an influence on the levels of cooperation, resistance,
perceived stress and the turnover rate. These dynamics and their consequences are
illustrated in Figure 2:
This study provides new insights into the performance implications of cultural
differences in M&As. First, I show that organizational cultural differences are more
central to M&A outcomes than national cultural differences. More specifically, I argue
that differences in organizational values and norms tend to be strongly associated with in-
group versus out-group biases. National cultural differences also play an important role in
cross-border M&As but they are likely to be less central. Previous research supports this
Mediating Variable
Cultural dimensions:
National culture and 
organizational culture
Independent Variable
Socio-cultural integration 
processes: Formation of 
interpersonal relationships, trust 
and shared identity
Outcomes: Level of 
cooperation, perceived
stress, resistance, turnover 
rate
Dependent Variable
Figure 2. A model of socio-cultural integration processes in the context of cross-border M&As.
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argument. Weber (1996) found that in cross-border acquisitions national cultural
differences were positively associated with attitudinal and behavioural outcomes, whereas
in domestic acquisitions, differences in organizational culture were negatively associated
with employee commitment, attitudes towards the merger and the level of cooperation
between employees of the merged firms. Very, Lubatkin, Calori, and Veiga (1997) found
that cross-border acquisitions were associated with lower levels of cultural difficulties than
domestic acquisitions, while Larsson and Risberg (1998) reported a higher number of
cultural clashes in domestic than in international acquisitions. Recently, Stahl and Voigt
(2008) revealed that national cultural differences are more positively related with socio-
cultural integration outcomes than organizational cultural differences. This argument has
also been supported by Vaara et al. (2010) who argue that organizational cultural
differences can be seen as root causes of social conflict, while national cultural differences
are negatively associated with conflict. This is explained by the fact that organizational
cultural differences are the key social identity category in cross-border M&As whereas
national cultural differences are less central.
Second, I demonstrate that socio-cultural integration which captures the less tangible
cultural, organizational and human resources implications of M&A has a mediating
impact on the relationship between national and organizational cultural differences and
M&A outcomes. More specifically, I show how the overall pattern of connections between
employees of the combined firms (interpersonal relationships), the kind of personal
relationship people develop with each other (trust) and shared interpretations and systems
of meaning among parties (shared identity) are influenced by cultural differences and how
they in turn impact M&A outcomes. Eight years ago, King et al. (2004) found that none of
the most commonly studied antecedent variables were significant in predicting acquisition
performance, while four years later Stahl and Voigt (2008) reported that socio-cultural
integration processes are the missing link in our understanding of the performance
implications of cultural differences in M&As. Given that existing empirical research has
failed to identify the factors that affect M&A performance, it has been argued that even
small effect sizes are theoretically and practically meaningful (Stahl and Voigt 2008). My
empirical findings illustrate that the cause–effect relation between culture and M&A
outcomes is far more complex than has been previously acknowledged and studied. The
contribution lies in assessing the simultaneous influence of the formation of interpersonal
relationships, trust and shared identity on M&A outcomes. In addition, I demonstrate the
interrelatedness and combined importance of social capital theory and socio-cultural
integration dynamics in the context of cross-border M&As. The findings suggest that
decisions and interventions must be based on a careful understanding of the social realities
of two merging firms. Structural, relational and cognitive dimensions of social capital
impact the stability and connections that allow organizations to hold together.
Third, by obtaining data at multiple points in time and incorporating a longitudinal
perspective into the study I have responded to the call of several authors (Duncan and Eero
2005; Yu, Engleman, and Van de Van 2005). I was able to show that M&A dynamics are
not a continuous linear progression over time. Instead, critical incidents are specific events
that can have a disruptive impact on M&A outcomes. I consider the extensive database to
be the strength of this qualitative study that allowed me to explore in depth the causes of
negative M&A outcomes.
Finally, my study has also implications for international human resource management
(IHRM). The qualitative data shows that attention to people and cultural issues is one of
the most critical factors in making cross-border acquisitions work. The analysis of pre-
merger cultural issues has value in predicting post-merger integration outcomes. Yet
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pre-merger cultural differences are not the main indicator of the emerging dynamics. Far
more important are significant occurrences or critical incidents that are the result of
cross-cultural interactions and the way they are managed. They can harm or facilitate
socio-cultural integration processes. These processes in turn have a mediating impact on
M&A outcomes and if not managed effectively may undermine the realization of
synergies. Therefore, IHRM should pay close attention to the challenges associated with
M&A dynamics at all stages in the acquisition process. Only by being excessively cautious
in studying, analysing and assessing the cultures and observing the quality of cross-
cultural interactions IHRM professionals can facilitate effective socio-cultural integration.
In terms of limitations, I should mention the following: First, I rely on a single case
study analysis. Multiple in-depth case studies give a stronger base for theory building (Yin
1994), since propositions derived from several cases are more deeply grounded in varied
empirical evidence (Eisenhardt 1991). Second, this is a study of a merger between an
Austrian and a German company. According to the findings from the GLOBE study
(House, Hanges, Javidan, Dorfman, and Gupta 2004), Austria and Germany belong to the
Germanic cluster and thus are characterized by similar societal values and practices. By
using a similar research design and looking at the processes of integration between firms
from different cultural clusters, future research could provide new insights into the
dynamics of M&A socio-cultural integration processes. Finally, I would like to mention
once more that the purpose of this study was to generate and not to test theory, which is
why I chose a qualitative research design. In an attempt to reconcile the conflicting
findings in the literature, I have developed a set of propositions regarding mechanisms by
which cultural differences may influence M&A outcomes. At the next stage I would like to
see the generation of quantitative data to test my assumptions and the model.
References
Ahuja, G. (1996), ‘Collaboration and Innovation: A Longitudinal Study of Interfirm Linkages and
Firm Patenting Performance in the Global Advanced Materials Industry,’ unpublished Ph.D.
dissertation, University of Michigan.
Buono, A.F., and Bowditch, J.L. (1989), The Human Side of Mergers and Acquisitions: Managing
Collisions Between People, Cultures and Organizations, San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.
Burt, R.S. (1992), Structural Holes: The Social Structure of Competition, Cambridge, MA: Harvard
University Press.
Cartwright, S., and Schoenberg, R. (2006), ‘Thirty Years of Mergers and Acquisitions Research:
Recent Advances and Future Opportunities,’ British Journal of Management, 17, 1–5.
Cartwright, S. (1997), ‘Organizational Partnerships: The Role of Human Factors in Mergers,
Acquisitions and Strategic Alliances,’ in Creating Tomorrow’s Organizations, eds. C.L. Cooper
and S.E. Jackson, London: Wiley, pp. 251–267.
Cartwright, S., and Cooper, C.L. (1996), Managing Mergers, Acquisitions, and Strategic Alliances:
Integrating People and cultures (2nd ed.), Oxford: Butterworth and Heinemann.
Chatterjee, S., Lubatkin, M.H., Schweiger, D.M., and Weber, Y. (1992), ‘Cultural Differences and
Shareholder Value in Related Mergers: Linking Equity and Human Capital,’ Strategic
Management Journal, 13, 319–334.
Chell, E. (1998), ‘Critical Incident Technique,’ in Qualitative Methods and Analysis in
Organizational Research: A Practical Guide, eds. Gillian Symon and Catherine Cassell,
Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, pp. 51–72.
Cicourel, A.V. (1973), Cognitive Sociology, Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin Books.
Das, T.K., and Teng, B.S. (1998), ‘Between Trust and Control: Developing Confidence in Partner
Cooperation in Alliances,’ Academy of Management Review, 2, 491–512.
Datta, D.K., and Puia, G. (1995), ‘Cross-Border Acquisitions: An Examination of the Influence of
Relatedness and Cultural Fit on Shareholder Value Creation in U.S. Acquiring Firms,’
Management International Review, 35, 337–359.
The International Journal of Human Resource Management 213
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ru
ne
l U
niv
ers
ity
 L
on
do
n]
 at
 06
:52
 19
 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
David, K., and Singh, H. (1994), ‘Sources of Acquisition Cultural Risk,’ in The Management of
Corporate Acquisitions, eds. G. Krogh, A. Sinatra, and H. Singh, London: Macmillan Press,
pp. 251–292.
Dirks, K.T., and Ferrin, D.L. (2001), ‘The Role of Trust in Organizational Setting,’ Organization
Science, 12, 450–467.
Duncan, A., and Eero, V. (2005), ‘Introduction to the Special Issue: Connectivity in Merging
Organizations: Beyond Traditional Cultural Perspectives,’ Organization Studies, 26,
1445–1453.
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1989), ‘Building Theory From Case Study Research,’ Academy of Management
Review, 4, 532–550.
Eisenhardt, K.M. (1991), ‘Better Stories and Better Constructs: The Case of Rigor and Comparative
Logic,’ Academy of Management Review, 16, 620–627.
Flanagan, J.C. (1954), ‘The Critical Incident Technique,’ Psychological Bulletin, 51, 327–355.
Gephart, R.P. (2004), ‘Qualitative Research and the Academy of Management Journal,’ Academy of
Management Journal, 40, 454–462.
Granovetter, M.S. (1992), ‘Problems of Explanation in Economic Sociology,’ in Networks and
Organizations: Structure, Form and Action, eds. N. Nohria and R. Eccles, Boston, MA: Harvard
Business School Press, pp. 25–56.
Gundry, L., and Rousseau, D. (1994), ‘Critical Incidents in Communicating Culture to newcomers:
The Meaning Is the Message,’ Human Relations, 47, 1063–1087.
Hofstede, G. (1980), Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-Related Values,
London: Sage.
House, R.J., Hanges, P.J., Javidan, M., Dorfman, P.W., and Gupta, V. (2004), Leadership, Culture,
and Organizations: The GLOBE Study of 62 Societies, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Ishii, J., and Xuan, Y. (2010), ‘Acquirer-Target Social Ties and Merger Outcomes,’ Working Paper,
Harvard Business School.
Javidan, M., and House, R.J. (September, 2002), The Impact of National Culture on Large Cross-
Border Mergers: Lessons From GLOBE, Paper presented at the Strategic Management Society
conference, Paris, France.
Jones, G.R., and George, J.M. (1998), ‘The Experience and Evolution of Trust: Implications for
Cooperation and Teamwork,’ Academy of Management Review, 23, 531–546.
King, D.R., Dalton, D.R., Daily, C.M., and Covin, J.G. (2004), ‘Meta-Analyses of Post-acquisition
Performance: Indications of Unidentified Moderators,’ Strategic Management Journal, 25,
187–200.
Koka, B., and Prescott, J. (2002), ‘Strategic Alliances as Social Capital: A Multidimensional View,’
Strategic Management Journal, 23, 795–816.
Krug, J.A., and Nigh, D. (2001), ‘Executive Perceptions in Foreign and Domestic Acquisitions: An
Analysis of Foreign Ownership and Its Effect on Executive Fate,’ Journal of World Business, 36,
85–105.
Larsson, R., and Lubatkin, M. (2001), ‘Achieving Acculturation in Mergers and acquIsitions: An
International Case Study,’ Human Relations, 54, 1573–1607.
Larsson, R., and Risberg, A. (1998), ‘Cultural Awareness and National Versus Corporate Barriers to
Acculturation,’ in Cultural Dimensions of International Mergers and Acquisitions, eds.
M.C. Gertsen, A.M. Søderberg, and J.E. Torp, Berlin, Germany: De Gruyter, pp. 39–56.
Madhavan, R. (1996), ‘Strategic Flexibility in the Steel Industry: The Role of Inter-firm Linkages,’
unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh.
Morosini, P., Shane, S., and Singh, H. (1998), ‘National Cultural Distance and Cross-Border
Acquisition Performance,’ Journal of International Business Studies, 29, 137–158.
Nahapiet, J., and Ghoshal, S. (1998), ‘Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational
Advantage,’ Academy of Management Review, 23, 242–266.
Olie, R. (1994), ‘Shades of Culture and Institutions in International Mergers,’ Organisation Studies,
15, 381–405.
O’Reilly, C.A., and Chatman, J.A. (1996), ‘Culture as Social Control: Corporations, Cults, and
Commitment,’ in Research in Organizational Behaviour (Vol. 18), eds. Barry M. Staw and
Larry L. Cummings, Greenwich, CT: Jai Press, pp. 157–200.
Reus, T.H., and Lamont, B.T. (2009), ‘The Double-Edged Sword of Cultural Distance In
International Acquisitions,’ Journal of International Business Studies, 49, 1298–1316.
A. Hajro214
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ru
ne
l U
niv
ers
ity
 L
on
do
n]
 at
 06
:52
 19
 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
Rousseau, D.M., Sitkin, S.B., Burt, R.S., and Camerer, C. (1998), ‘Not So Different After All: A
Cross-Discipline View of Trust,’ Academy of Management Review, 23, 393–404.
Scheibelhofer, E. (2008), ‘Combining Narration-Based Interviews with Topical Interviews:
Methodological Reflection on Research Practices,’ International Journal of Social Research
Methodology, 11, 403–416.
Shan, W., Walker, G., and Kogut, B. (1994), ‘Interfirm Cooperation and Startup Innovation in the
Biotechnology Industry,’ Strategic Management Journal, 15, 129–139.
Stahl, G.K., and Sitkin, S.B. (2005), ‘Trust in Mergers and Acquisitions,’ in Mergers and
Acquisitions: Managing Culture and Human Resources, eds. G.K. Stahl and M.E. Mendenhall,
Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 82–102.
Stahl, G.K., and Voigt, A. (2005), ‘Impact of Cultural Differences on Merger and Acquisition
Performance: A Critical Research Review and an Integrative Model,’ Advances in Mergers and
Acquisitions, 4, 51–83.
Stahl, G.K., and Voigt, A. (2008), ‘Do Cultural Differences Matter in Mergers and Acquisitions? A
Tentative Model and Examination,’ Organization Science, 19, 160–178.
Strauss, A., and Corbin, J. (1998), Basics of Qualitative Research: Techniques and Procedures for
Developing Grounded Theory (2nd ed.), Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Szabo, E., Brodbeck, F.C., Den Hartog, D.N., Reber, G., Weibler, J., and Wunderer, R. (2002), ‘The
Germanic Europe Cluster: Where Employees Have a Voice,’ Journal of World Business, 37,
55–68.
Teerikangas, S., and Very, P. (2006), ‘The Culture-Performance Relationship in M&A: From Yes/
No to How,’ British Journal of Management, 17, 31–48.
Tsai, W., and Ghoshal, S. (1998), ‘Social Capital and Value Creation: The Role of Intrafirm
Networks,’ Academy of Management Journal, 41, 464–476.
Vaara, E., Sarala, R., Stahl, G., and Bjorkman, I. (2010), ‘The Impact of Organizational and National
Cultural Differences on Social Conflict and Knowledge Transfer in International Acquisitions,’
Journal of Management Studies, 49, 1–27.
Van Knippenberg, D., Van Knippenberg, B., Monden, L., and Lima, F. (2002), ‘Organizational
Identification After a Merger: A Social Identity Perspective,’ The British Journal of Social
Psychology, 41, 233–252.
Very, P., Lubatkin, M., Calori, R., and Veiga, J. (1997), ‘Relative Standing and the Performance of
Recently Acquired European Firms,’ Strategic Management Journal, 18, 593–614.
Weber, Y. (1996), ‘Corporate Cultural Fit and Performance in Mergers and Acquisitions,’ Human
Relations, 49, 1181–1202.
Whetton, D.A. (1989), ‘What Constitutes a Theoretical Contribution?’ Academy of Management
Review, 14, 490–495.
Witzel, A. (2000), ‘The Problem-Centered Interview,’ Forum: Qualitative Social Research, 1, 1–10.
Yin, Robert (1994), Case-Study Research: Design and Methods (2nd ed.), Thousand Oaks, CA:
Sage.
Yli-Renko, H., Autio, E., and Sapienza, H.J. (2001), ‘Social Capital, Knowledge Acquisition, and
Knowledge Exploitation in Young Technology-Based Firms,’ Strategic Management Journal,
22, 587–613.
Yu, J., Engleman, R.M., and Van de Van, A.H. (2005), ‘The Integration Journey: An Attention-
Based View of the Merger and Acquisition Integration Process,’ Organization Studies, 26,
1501–1528.
Zaheer, A., McEvily, B., and Perrone, V. (1998), ‘Does Trust Matter? Exploring the Effects of
Interorganizational and Interpersonal Trust on Performance,’ Organization Science, 9,
141–159.
The International Journal of Human Resource Management 215
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [B
ru
ne
l U
niv
ers
ity
 L
on
do
n]
 at
 06
:52
 19
 M
arc
h 2
01
5 
